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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. Defendant Gibson Products 
Company (hereinafter "Gibsons") andf specificallyf the 
manager of its West Valley store, defendant Chad Crosgrove, 
(hereinafter "Crosgrove") accused plaintiff Mrs. Shauna 
Hodges, a part-time bookkeeper at the West Valley store, of 
stealing approximately $580 from receipts received on 
September 3, 1981 (Ex. 3). The defendants made the 
accusations to the West Valley Police Department on 
September 9, 1981 (Ex. 3), but failed to make a full and 
fair disclosure of all the facts they knew concerning the 
alleged crime. (R. 611-22, 842-54; Ex. 3). Mrs. Shauna 
Hodges was arrested on a charge of theft (Ex. 4) and trial 
was set for May 12, 1982. During the interim, Gibsons 
suspended Mrs. Hodges from her employment. (R. 863). 
On March 18, 1982, Gibsons allowed Mr. Crosgrove to 
resign his employment when he admitted stealing and 
embezzling from the West Valley store cash and goods worth 
between $9,000 and $18,000. (R. 588, 861). Gibsons failed 
to inform the prosecuting attorney of Crosgrove1s thievery 
until the eve of trial. (R. 686-87; Ex. 15). Immediately 
upon learning of this criminal conduct, the prosecutor 
successfully moved to dismiss all charges against Shauna 
Hodges. (R. 686-87; Exs. 6 & 15). 
Shauna Hodges brought this action for malicious 
prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against both defendants and for wrongful termination against 
defendant Gibsons. (R. 2-11). Gibsons counterclaimed for 
conversion of the money missing from the West Valley store's 
receipts of September 3, 1981. (R. 22-23). 
The case was tried to a jury, the Honorable John A. 
Rokich presiding, on July 9-13, 1985. The jury found 
Gibsons and Crosgrove liable for malicious prosecution and 
also found Gibsons liable for wrongful termination. The 
jury awarded Mrs. Hodges $70,000 in compensatory damages and 
$7,000 in punitive damages from Gibsons and $10,000 in 
compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages from 
Crosgrove. The jury also found that Mrs. Hodges was not 
liable to Gibsons for conversion. (R. 464-66). 
B. Statement of the Facts. On September 17, 1981, 
Shauna Hodges was arrested and charged with theft of $577, a 
third degree felony, from Gibsons West Valley store on 
September 4, 1981. (R. 924-26; Ex. 4 & 5). Trial was set 
for May 12, 1982. (R. 107) In the interim, her chief 
accuser, Crosgrove, the manager of the Gibsons West Valley 
store where she was employed, admitted to stealing 
merchandise and cash worth over $9,000. (R. 589, 861). 
Gibsons kept this information from the Salt Lake County 
Attorney who was prosecuting the action until the very eve 
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of trial, (R. 107). When the County Attorney learned that 
"the chief witness against Mrs. Hodges had been fired for 
embezzlement," he successfully moved to have the case 
dismissed. (R. 687; Exs. 6 & 15). 
On September 4, 1981, the Thursday before Labor 
Day, Shauna Hodges was employed as a part-time bookkeeper at 
the Gibsons West Valley store; (R. 903) Chad Crosgrove was 
the manager of that store. (R. 774-75). During the day of 
September 3f 1981, cash register number four, at the front 
checkout, had been used. (R. 785). At the end of the 
evening, following normal procedures, all of the money was 
taken from each register, except for $100 which remains in 
each register drawer for use the next day. (R. 777-78). 
The normal procedure was to take all of the "detail tapes", 
cash (except for $100) and "voids" out of the registers and 
put them in a separate cloth sack marked with that 
register's number. (R. 777-81). The "detail tapes" list a 
complete record of what was "run" on the register for that 
day. (R. 780). A "Z" tape, which is a total for each 
register, was also run out of the machine and kept separate 
from the register bags. (R. 777, 780). 
The sacks from all of the registers were then 
placed at the "service desk" at the front of the store (R. 
782) and then all were placed in one large paper sack (R. 
786-87). The "Z" tapes were also placed loose in the same 
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large paper sack. (R. 786-77). "Z" tapes sometimes were 
"run" only from those registers which had been used during 
the day, (R. 784) and sometimes were run also from registers 
that were not used. (R. 907-08). The large paper sack 
containing the money sacks and two tapes was then locked in 
the safe for the evening. (R. 793). 
Crosgrove claimed that on the evening of September 
3, 1981, he put the large paper sack containing all the 
money sacks and the "Z" tapes in the safe. (R. 793). 
Crosgrove then left the store between 9:10 and 9:55 when all 
the other employees had left the store. (R. 793). 
There is no written record kept of what registers 
are used during the day. The only way to determine if a 
register had been used during the day is if there was a 
money sack or a used "ZM tape in the large paper sack or to 
ask some individual with personal knowledge. (R. 783-88). 
If the large paper sack did not contain a money sack or a 
"Z" tape for a particular register, one would have to assume 
that the register had not been used, unless one had personal 
knowledge to the contrary. (R. 785-86). 
The next morning, Crosgrove opened the store alone 
at approximately 8:30 a.m., before any other employees 
arrived. (R. 799-800). He also was alone when he opened the 
safe shortly after opening the store. (R. 829). Sometime 
after 9:00 a.m., Shauna Hodges, following her normal 
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procedure, reported to work and obtained the paper sack from 
Crosgrove. (R. 831). Mr. Crosgrove took the large paper 
sack containing the individual money sacks out of the 
safe. (R. 832). Carrying that sack, he escorted Shauna 
Hodges to a room upstairs, known as the security room, where 
she normally performed her duties. (R. 911). He left 
Shauna Hodges with the sack and the money bags. He never 
verified to Mrs. Hodges what specific money bags were in the 
paper sack. (R. 244, 324). The "security room" was not a 
secure room, but merely an upstairs room, (R. 905, 909) 
access to which was restricted to the manager, Crosgrove, 
the assistant manager and the two bookkeepers, including 
Mrs. Hodges. (R. 910-11). 
Mrs. Hodges began to do her work as she always 
did. She laid out all of the money bags and tapes on a 
table; she totalled all the checks, cash and other items for 
each register and placed the figures on the daily report. 
(R. 906, 911-12). She compared the totals for each register 
for which she had a money sack to the totals listed on the 
"Z" tapes. (R. 907, 911-12). Some of the bags contained 
more cash than was reported on the register tapes. Although 
Mrs. Hodges could have put this small change in her pocket 
and no one would have been able to determine that it was 
missing, she reported on the daily report that each of these 
registers had excess money. (R. 677; Ex. 8). 
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Mrs. Hodges then completed the necessary forms for 
the bank deposit. When her work was accomplished and before 
leaving the store, she gave the daily report along with the 
bank deposit, including all money to be deposited, to Mr. 
Crosgrove at approximately 1:00 p.m. (R. 836, 912). 
Although company policy required that the bank deposit be 
made by 3:00 p.m. each day, Mr. Crosgrove, in violation of 
that policy, delayed making the bank deposit. (R. 838, 
1078-79). 
Around 4:00 p.m. on September 4, 1981, Mr. Glen 
Murray, the assistant store manager, who had worked during 
the daytime hours on September 3, looked at the daily report 
lying on Crosgrove's desk and saw that cash register number 
four was not listed. (R. 839-40). Mr. Murray, apparently 
remembered that register number four had been used the 
previous day and called the matter to Mr. Crosgrove's 
attention. (R. 839-40). Mr. Crosgrove verified that the 
register had been used and that the cash receipts were not 
listed on the daily report. 
At this point, according to Mr. Crosgrove1s version 
of the facts, he either called Mrs. Hodges and then went to 
the security room, or vice versa. (R. 840-41). Mrs. Hodges 
came back to the store and Mr. Crosgrove then called the 
corporate headquarters in Murray. (R. 843). Before Mrs. 
Hodges returned, Mr. Crosgrove and Mr. Murray, the assistant 
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manager, found part of the "Z" tape for register four in the 
wastepaper basket in the security room, (R. 847-48). In 
his storyf Mr. Crosgrove claimed he found checks he 
identified as being from register number four in the deposit 
bag while Mrs. Hodges was in the room, (R. 847-48) although 
this involved a line by line examination of all the detail 
tapes from each register. (R. 896). He also gave 
conflicting testimony that he could not identify the checks 
as being from register four until after Mr. Harris, the 
corporate accountant, performed an audit. (R. 849). Later 
in the day, Mr. Crosgrove, with Mr. Murray and Mr. Harris 
found additional tapes and slips from register four, plus 
torn deposit slips from Mrs. Hodges' personal checking 
account in the garbage. (R. 851, 854-55). 
According to Mrs. Hodges, when she returned to the 
store and while in the "security room," Mr. Crosgrove showed 
Mrs. Hodges that register number four was not reported, that 
the checks from register number four were included in the 
deposit for register number six; and, also, he showed her 
the other tapes and void slips he claimed to have found in 
the garbage. (R. 917-18). 
Mr. Harris testified that he could only locate the 
checks from register four after a tedious review of the 
deposit and all of the register tapes at the Murray store, 
(R. 1052-53; 1057-59; 1095). Additionally, Mr. Harris 
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testified that the tapes in the garbage can were discovered 
after he went to the West Valley store. (R. 1056-57). 
Certain factsf howeverf remain clear. Mr. 
Crosgrove, with or without other employees, checked Mrs. 
Hodges1 work area. Subsequent investigation by Mr. Harris, 
the internal auditor of Gibsons, revealed that someone had 
removed the checks and cash from register number four. The 
checks which had been in register number four, were placed 
in register number two and a like amount of cash removed. 
Neither the cash representing the face amount of the checks 
taken in on register number four, nor the cash taken in on 
register number four were ever found or recorded on any of 
the reports. (R. 1052, 1059). Mrs. Hodges consistently 
claimed that she never received the money sack for register 
number four from Crosgrove. (R. 912, 915; Ex. 8). 
After the Labor Day weekend on Tuesday, September 
8th, Gibsons management called Mrs. Hodges to the main 
office and asked for an explanation. Mrs. Hodges offered no 
explanation since she had not committed the crime. (R. 918-
19). At that meeting, Gibsons offered to allow Mrs. Hodges 
to resign and let the matter drop if she would pay back the 
the missing money. (R. 920). Mrs* Hodges, protesting her 
innocence, refused to pay back the money since she had not 
taken it. (R. 920). 
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The next day, three of Gibsons1 officers and 
managers, at the direction of their superiors, at Gibsons, 
went to the West Valley Police and reported the theft. Each 
of them testified that they went to the police in their 
capacity as employees or managers of Gibsons. (R. 596-611f 
679-80, 859, 1074). 
They spoke to Gene Lyday, a detective at the West 
Valley Police Department. Mr. Crosgrove identified Mrs. 
Hodges as the chief suspect. (R. 615; Ex. 3). The story 
they told the detective was not a full and accurate story. 
In fact, it was replete with misstatements and omissions. 
Among other things, no one told Detective Lyday that at that 
time Mr. Crosgrove had been stealing regularly from the 
Gibsons West Valley store; (R. 1081) or that it was the 
assistant manager who discovered that the money was 
missing. (R. 842, 1080-82). In fact, they told Detective 
Lyday that it was Mr. Crosgrove who discovered the missing 
money. (R. 618-19). They also told the detective that it 
was Mr. Crosgrove who discovered the missing register tapes 
torn up in the wastepaper basket in the security room. (R. 
621). Based on this inaccurate and incomplete information, 
Detective Lyday completed a sworn information and a probable 
cause statement supporting the charges against Mrs. 
Hodges. (R. 621-23; Ex. 3 & 5). 
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The Salt Lake County prosecutor reviewed the 
information he was given by Detective Lyday and decided to 
prosecute Mrs. Hodges for theft. (R. 684; Ex. 5 & 14). 
At the probable cause hearing, Crosgrove continued 
to supply false and misleading information. He did not 
reveal that he was in the process of stealing money from 
Gibsons; he swore that it was he who discovered that the 
money was missing and he neglected to state that it was not 
him, but his assistant manager Glenn Murray who discovered 
the discrepancy on the daily report. (R. 842). 
Mrs. Hodges was bound over for trial, was taken out 
in handcuffs and told to report to pretrial services at 
least once a day. (R. 927-29). Trial was scheduled for May 
11, 1982. 
During that interval, Mrs. Hodges was undergoing 
severe emotional distress. Her family had been going to a 
social worker for some time to deal with problems with her 
son. As soon as the arrest occurred, Mrs. Hodges began 
seeing the clinical social worker for individual therapy for 
the severe depression and severe emotional distress induced 
by the trauma of having been accused of a crime. (R. 935-
49) . 
It was during that same interval when Gibsons 
discovered that Mr. Crosgrove the accuser of Mrs. Hodges, 
had stolen between $9,000 and $18,000 in cash and 
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merchandise from the Gibsons West Valley Store. (R. 599, 
861). This thievery had been going on since prior to 
September 3-4, 1981. (R. 862). Mr. Crosgrove would remove 
merchandise from the store after all the employees had 
left. (R. 900-02). Also, he would steal cash by some 
complicated process whereby he delayed submitting the bank 
deposits for the store for several days, similar to the way 
he delayed submitting the bank deposit on September 4, 
1981. (R. 862). The Gibsons management discovered this by 
an audit of their books and records and on March 18f 1982, 
allowed Mr. Crosgrove to repay $9,000 of the money he had 
stolen and resign. (R. 599, 861; Ex. 19). The Gibsons 
management never reported the theft to the West Valley 
Police and made no attempt to prosecute Mr. Crosgrove. (R. 
601). They allowed him to cut a deal, the same deal they 
had offered to Mrs. Hodges. (R. 601). However, unlike Mrs. 
Hodges who did not commit a crime, Mr. Crosgrove had 
committed the crime and took advantage of the deal rather 
than face the criminal justice system. (R. 861-62). 
The Gibsons management never informed the Salt Lake 
County prosecutor who was prosecuting the case against Mrs. 
Hodges that Crosgrove, Mrs. Hodges' chief accuser, was 
stealing left and right from the West Valley store. (R. 
60). As Mr. Harris explained: He "only [did] what was 
directed by the officers of the company" and "it was not 
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[his] responsibility" to inform the prosecutor or the police 
about this exculpatory evidence. (R. 1081-82). However, 
two days before trial, one of Gibsons1 management employees, 
Mr. Birch, "communicated to the county attorney that the 
charges would be dropped." (R. 644-46, 721-24). As soon as 
the county prosecutor learned that his star witness had been 
caught with his hands in the till, he moved to have the case 
dismissed. (R. 686, Ex. 15). As the prosecutor testified: 
"According to the information, the only person [sic] who had 
access to the money was Mr. Crosgrove and Mrs. Hodges . . 
." (R. 696). The day after the case was dismissed, Gibsons 
fired Mrs. Hodges claiming that she had failed to follow 
proper procedures. (R. 953-54; Ex. 27). 
Thereafter, Mrs. Hodges continued to suffer great 
emotional distress manifesting itself in various ways, 
including great tension at home and a significant weight 
gain. She continued to seek psychological therapy from the 
clinical social worker. Also, she attempted to obtain other 
employment. Despite the fact that she had a great deal of 
experience, she was unable to obtain any employment as a 
bookkeeper, or in any other capacity. The false accusation 
and the wrongful termination notice continued to haunt her, 
as it still haunts her. (R. 935-53). 
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C. Summary of Arguments. 
1. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that 
defendants Gibsons and Crosgrove caused the institution of 
criminal proceedings against plaintiff Shauna Hodges who was 
not guilty of the offense charged and that they did so 
without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other 
than that of bringing Mrs. Hodges to justice and the 
criminal proceedings against Mrs. Hodges were terminated in 
her favor. Additionally, because both defendants refused to 
inform the prosecuting attorney until the eve of Mrs. Hodges 
criminal trial that there was substantial exculpatory 
evidence which they had knowledge of for some time, they are 
liable for continuing malicious prosecution. 
2* Gibsons terminated plaintiff on the basis of a 
false criminal accusation which it knew to be false. That 
action violated the public policy of the state andf thusf 
Gibsons is liable for wrongful termination of the plaintiff. 
3. Both defendants1 actions against Mrs. Hodges in 
procuring the initiation of a criminal action against her 
were done maliciously, wantonly and with reckless disregard 
for the rights of Mrs. Hodges and subjects them to punitive 
damages. 
4. Plaintiff was not required to plead the exact 
dollar amount of her special and general damages. Since 
plaintiff's complaint placed defendants on notice of the 
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type and nature of the special damages claimed, the 
instructions submitted by the court to the jury concerning 
damages were correct. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT BOTH GIBSONS AND CROSGROVE 
ARE LIABLE TO MRS. HODGES FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
COMPORTS WITH UTAH LAW AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Restatement of Tortsf Secondf §653f succinctly sets 
out the elements of a cause of action for malicious 
prosecution: 
A private person who initiates or procures 
the institution of criminal proceedings 
against another who is not guilty of the 
offense charged is subject to liability 
for malicious prosecution if 
(a) He initiates or procures the 
proceedings without probable cause and 
primarily for a purpose other than that of 
bringing an offender to justice, and 
(b) The proceedings have terminated 
in favor of the accused. 
Cf. Shippers' Best Express, Inc. v. Newson, 579 P.2d 1316 
(Utah 1978); Kennedy v. Burbidge, 183 P. 325 (Utah 1918). 
At trial, plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, each and every one of these elements: 
Ac The criminal proceedings were terminated in 
favor of Mrs. Hodges. 
Section 659 of the Restatement states in pertinent 
part: 
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Criminal proceedings are terminated 
in favor of the accused by 
(c) The formal abandonment of the 
proceeding by the public prosecutor. . . 
Restatement of Tortsf Second, §659. The authors also 
explained what is "formal abandonment of the proceedings": 
The rule stated in this Section is 
applicablef howeverf to any method other 
than that of the entry of nolle prosequi/ 
by which a public prosecutor may formally 
abandon the prosecution of the proceedings 
as, for example, by a motion to dismiss 
the complaint. 
Id. comment e (emphasis added). See, also, Gowin v. 
Heider, 386 P.2d 1 (Or. 1963). 
In this instance, the prosecutor moved to dismiss 
the action as soon as he learned the truth about Mr. 
Crosgrove. (R. 686-87; Ex. 15). That motion was granted 
and the criminal proceeding was terminated favorably for 
Mrs. Hodges. (Ex. 6). 
B. The defendants procured the initiation of 
criminal proceedings against Mrs. Hodges without probable 
cause. 
There is no doubt that under Utah law and the facts 
of this case, Gibsons and Crosgrove are liable for 
initiating the criminal proceedings against Shauna Hodges. 
The draftors of the Restatement of Torts Second explained 
that: 
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Criminal proceedings are initiated by 
making a charge before a public official 
or body in such form as to require the 
official or body to determine whether 
process shall or shall not be issued 
against the accused. 
Restatement of Tortsf Second, §653 comment c. CJ[. Id. 
comment d. However, the draftors realized fully that the 
police and prosecutors are often misled when an accuser 
fails to make a full and fair disclosure to the 
authorities. The deceptive accuser is then held 
responsible. 
Influencing a Public Prosecutor. A 
private person who gives to a public 
official information of another's supposed 
criminal misconduct, of which the official 
is ignorantf obviously causes the 
institution of such subsequent proceedings 
as the official may begin on his own 
initiative/ but giving the information or 
even making an accusation of criminal 
misconduct does not constitute a 
procurement of the proceedings initiated 
by the officer if it is left entirely to 
his discretion to initiate the proceedings 
or not. 
If, howevery the information is known 
by the giver to be false, an intelligent 
exercise of the officer's discretion 
becomes impossible, and a prosecution 
based upon it is procured by the person 
giving the false information. In order to 
charge a private person with 
responsibility for the initiation of 
proceedings by a public official, it must 
therefore appear that his desire to have 
the proceedings initiated, expressed by 
direction, request or pressure of any 
kind, was a determining factor in the 
official's decision to commence the 
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prosecution, or that the information 
furnished by him upon which the official 
acted was known to be false. 
Id. comment g (emphasis added). 
Utah law recognizes that a full and fair disclosure 
of the facts made to the prosecuting attorney presents a 
good defense to an action for malicious prosecution. As 
noted in the comments to the Restatement, however, it is 
necessary that there be a full and fair disclosure of all 
material facts. See, Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, 
Inc. , 11 Utah2d 133, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960); Wendelboe v. 
Jacobson, 10 Utah2d 344, 353 P.2d 178, 181 (1960); Cottrell 
v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622, 623 
(1956); cf. Perkins v. Stephens, 28 Utah2d 436, 503 P.2d 
1212 (1972). 
Whether a defendant has made a full and fair 
disclosure is, however, a question of fact properly left to 
the jury. As this Court wrote in Cottrell v. Grand Union 
Tea Co.: 
The critical point of inquiry is 
this: Considering all of the evidence, 
could reasonable minds fairly say that 
they were not convinced by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendants made a 
full and truthful disclosure of the 
material facts to the county attorney? 
Id., 299 P.2d at 623. 
The evidence produced at trial shows without a doubt 
that there was no full and fair disclosure to Detective 
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Lyday or the prosecuting attorney. In fact, the story told 
to Detective Lyday and subsequently relied upon by the 
prosecutor, subtly, but effectively, removed the prime 
suspect from consideration. 
Mr. Crosgrove, when he went to the West Valley 
Police Department, for obvious self-serving reasons, failed 
to tell the detective that he, for some time, had been 
stealing money and merchandise from the store. (R. 862). 
Clearly, this was a material fact. Although it was the 
assistant manager who serendipitously discovered that the 
receipts from register number four were not on the daily 
report, all the Gibsons employees, Mr. Harris, Mr. Cornett, 
as well as Mr. Crosgrove, incorrectly informed Detective 
Lyday that it was Mr. Crosgrove who discovered that the 
money was missing. (Ex. 3; R. 618-19, 842, 1075-76).-1 
Additionally, they told Detective Lyday, falsely, that Mr. 
Crosgrove discovered all of the evidence in the security 
room wastepaper basket. (R. 621, 846; Ex. 3). If there had 
been a full and fair disclosure of all of the material facts 
to Detective Lyday, there would have been a different prime 
suspect. 
In fact, Mr. Crosgrove made the same misstatement in his sworn 
testimony at the probable cause hearing. (R. 842). Furthermore, Gibsons 
attempted to tell the same untrue story even after this action was initiated, but 
finally admitted to the truth. (R. 605). 
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The exact same issues were faced by the Oregon 
court in Lampos v. Bazar, Inc., 527 P.2d 376 (Or. 1974). In 
that case, plaintiff initiated an action for malicious 
prosecution after he had been accused by his employer of 
stealing two tires from its store, arrested and charged with 
theft. Defendant alleged, as here, that it could not be 
liable for initiating the action because it had made a full 
and fair disclosure. However, the defendant's employees 
failed to tell the grand jury that the plaintiff, when 
confronted with the accusation, had produced a copy of a 
receipt which he claimed showed that he had purchased the 
tires and had made a down payment of $5. The Oregon court, 
relying upon Varner v. Hoffer, 267 Or. 175, 515 P.2d 920 
(1973) and Restatement of Torts Second §666, comment g, 
found that the full and fair disclosure question was to be 
left to the jury to decide. Lampos, 527 P. 2d at 383. In 
that case, the court allowed the jury's finding against the 
defendant to stand. Id. 
Additionally, the defendants here failed to make a 
full and fair disclosure after the action was initiated. 
The jury was instructed in this case as follows: 
If you find that the defendants 
learned of the facts which tended to 
exculpate the plaintiff on the charges and 
that the defendants did not inform the 
authorities of such exculpatory facts, 
then you may consider that as a factor 
establishing malicious prosecution. 
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Jury Instruction No. 38. (R. 437). 
In Lampos v. Bazar, Inc., the defendant learned of 
the exculpatory evidence after they had spoken to the county 
attorneyf but prior to the time they testified before the 
grand jury. The court, relying on Restatement of Torts, 
Second, §662, comment f and §655 noted that under such 
circumstances, one who later learns of exculpatory facts may 
still be liable for malicious prosecution. Lampos, 527 P. 2d 
at 3 5. See, also, Rogers v. Hill, 576 P.2d 328, 333 (Or. 
1978). 
In this case, two months prior to the date set for 
trial, Gibsons learned of a major piece of exculpatory 
evidence. Mrs. Hodges1 prime accuser was indeed a thief and 
stealing from the West Valley store. (R. 549). 
Nonetheless, no one at Gibsons bothered to inform the 
prosecutor until the very eve of trial. (R6 600-01). In 
short, they withheld this exculpatory evidence allowing the 
prosecution to go forward for some time until it reached a 
point where they were going to be the subject of ridicule 
and public embarrassment. This fact alone allowed the jury 
to find Gibsons liable for continuing malicious prosecution. 
There is an abundance of evidence demonstrating 
that both defendants procured the initiation of the criminal 
proceedings against Mrs. Hodges without probable cause. 
Restatement of Torts, Second, §662 states: 
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One who initiates or continues criminal 
proceedings against another has probable 
cause for doing so if he correctly or 
reasonably believes 
(a) that the person whom he accuses 
has acted or failed to act in a particular 
manner; and 
(b) that those acts or omissions 
constitute the offense that he charges 
against the accused; and 
(c) that he is sufficiently informed 
as to the law and the facts to justify him 
in initiating or continuing the 
prosecution. 
For the defendants to have had probable cause, they 
must have had both a reasonable belief in the guilt of Mrs. 
Hodges, as well as a subjective belief. See, Gustafson v. 
Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 525 P.2d 118, 120 (Or. 
1974); Hryciuk v. Robinson, 213 Or. 542, 326 P.2d 424 
(1958); cf. Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 
Utah 2d 133, 355 P.2d 714, 717 (1960). 
The fact that the circuit court , after a hearing, 
found that there was probable cause to detain Mrs. Hodges 
and bound her over for trial is not conclusive proof that 
there was probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings 
against plaintiff. In Olsen v. Independent Order of 
Foresters, 7 Utah2d 322, 324 P.2d 1012 (1958) this Court 
found the fact that a magistrate bound over the accused for 
trial did not show that there was probable cause to initiate 
the proceedings. In fact, if the probable cause hearing was 
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tainted with false testimony, as heref then the probable 
cause hearing has no tendency whatsoever to show that there 
was probable cause. As the court ruled in Gowin v. Heider, 
386 P.2d 1 (Or. 1963) . 
[I]f [the indictment] was procured by 
false testimony of the defendant in an 
action for malicious prosecution it has no 
tendency whatever to establish probable 
cause. 
Id. at 9. Moreover, the fact that the defendants did not 
make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts to the 
authorities is evidence that the defendants initiated the 
proceedings without probable cause. See, Id., at 9; 
Restatement of Tortsf Second, §662(c). 
The defendants1 own actions may be used as evidence 
to show a lack of probable cause. 
The termination of the proceedings in 
favor of the accused at the instance of 
the private prosecutor who initiated them, 
or because of his failure to press the 
prosecution, is evidence of a lack of 
probable cause. 
Restatement of Torts Second, §665(1). 
Here, Gibsons own employee, Mr. Birch, acknowledges 
that it was he who informed the prosecutor that the charges 
would be dropped. (R. 644-46, 722-23). The Restatement 
requires that in order to determine the existence of 
probable cause: 
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One who initiates or continues criminal 
proceedings against another has probable 
cause for doing so if he correctly or 
reasonably believes 
(c) that he is sufficiently informed 
as to the law and the facts to justify him 
initiating or continuing the prosecution. 
Restatement of Tortsf Second, §662. In Comment j to that 
section, the draftors wrote: 
In summary, it may be said that the 
defendant has probable cause only when a 
reasonable man in his position would 
believe, and the defendant does in fact 
believe, that he has sufficient 
information as to both facts and the 
applicable law to justify him in 
initiating the criminal proceeding without 
further investigation or verification. 
Similarly, this Court explained in Cottrell v. Grand 
Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956): 
The defendant's agents were 
businessmen, who either were or should 
have been, entirely familiar with the 
facts and circumstances, and should have 
been acting with caution and 
circumspection in regard to a matter so 
serious as charging plaintiff with a 
felony. 
Id. at 626. 
In this action, there is an abundance of evidence to 
demonstrate that there was no probable cause for the 
defendants to initiate this proceeding. First, defendant 
Crosgrove clearly had exculpatory information which he 
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withheld from the police. Gibsons eventually informed the 
prosecutor that the charges would be dropped. (R. 644-46, 
722-23). Mr. Crosgrove even told one witness that he did 
not believe that Shauna Hodges took the money. (R. 704-05, 
714). 
C. These defendants initiated the criminal 
proceedings for an improper purpose. 
Restatement of Torts, Second, §668 states: 
To subject a person to liability for 
malicious prosecution, the proceedings 
must have been initiated primarily for a 
purpose other than that of bringing an 
offender to justice. 
Comment e to that section reads: 
The only proper purpose for which 
criminal proceedings can be instituted is 
that of bringing an offender to justice 
and thereby aiding in the enforcement of 
the criminal law. 
Comment g goes on to explain: 
One who initiates the proceedings to force 
the accused to pay money or to turn over land or 
chattels to the accuser, does not act for a proper 
purpose. This is true although the money is 
lawfully owed to the accuser or the thing in 
question has been unlawfully withheld or taken 
from him, so that relief might have been secured 
in the appropriate civil proceedings. 
Similarly, this Court has held that initiating 
criminal proceedings to force an accused to pay money is 
There is no doubt that Crosgrove was acting on behalf of Gibsons when 
he told his "story" to Detective Lyday. (R. 596). Therefore, Gibsons is liable for 
his actions. See, Coombs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272 
(1951). 
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improper r even if the money is lawfully owed. Haas v. 
Emmett, 28 Utah 2d 138, 459, P.2d 432,433 (1969). 
Furthermore, §669 of the Restatement of Torts, 
Second, reads: 
Lack of probable cause for the 
initiation of criminal proceedings in so 
far as it tends to show that the accuser 
did not believe in the guilt of the 
accused, is evidence that he did not 
initiate the proceedings for a proper 
purpose. 
Here there was ample evidence to show that the 
defendants did not have a proper purpose. Mr. Crosgrove did 
not reveal all of the true facts to the prosecutor or to the 
police. His purpose was obvious: to district attention 
from himself. Again, Gibsons is liable for his actions. 
Moreover, Gibsons independent actions show that 
they had an ulterior motive other than bringing an offender 
to justice. When they had an admitted thief on their hands, 
Crosgrove, they did not bring that offender to justice. (R. 
599-601). But after Mrs. Hodges refused to "buy" her 
innocence, and only after she refused, they then went to the 
West Valley Police. (R. 920). Finally, when Gibsons did 
learn of the exculpatory evidence in March, 1982, they did 
not turn that over to the police. Is that a corporation 
interested only in justice?3 
Defendants also claim that they were prejudiced because certain jury 
instructions used the word "guilty" rather than "liable". If anything, this would aid 
the defendants since the burden of proof standard in a "criminal action" is much 
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II. 
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRED THE COURT TO RECOGNIZE 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN THIS CASE 
In Utah, generally, an employee is free to quit her 
employment at any time and an employer is free to discharge 
the employee at any time with or without cause. See, e.g. , 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). However, 
this court has recognized that there are exceptions to the 
employment at will doctrine. In Bihlmaier v. Carson, the 
court wrote: 
In the absence of some further 
express or implied stipulation as to the 
duration of the employment or of a good 
consideration in addition to the services 
contracted to be rendered, the contract is 
no more than an indefinite general hiring 
which is terminable at the will of either 
party. 
Id. at 792. See, also, Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 
Utah2d 106, 307 P.2d 210, 211 (1957). Recently, in Rose v. 
Allied Development Co., 34 Utah Adv.Rep. 29 (Utah 1986), the 
court reaffirmed that exceptions to the at will doctrine 
exist. In that opinion, the court noted that "the 
employerfs absolute right to discharge employees has been 
greater than in a civil action. See, State v. Starks? 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1981)(beyond reasonable doubt standard). If the jury's minds were referred to a 
"criminal guilt-innocence context", appeal brief at 18; it benefitted the 
defendants. This Court will not reverse a jury verdict if the instructions 
constitute harmless error. See, e.g., Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 
448, 491 P.2d 1209 (1971); Universal Investment Co> v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 
336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965). Additionally, the jury was instructed properly on the 
burden of proof. (R. 407-09). 
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somewhat limited by subsequent federal and state 
legislation" expressing general public policy. jCd. at 30. 
In its opinion, the court noted two examples: the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 14 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) which prohibits 
the discharge of employees based on race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin; and also Utah Code Ann. §34-35-6 
(1953) which similarly prohibits the discharge of employees 
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or 
handicap. Rose v. Allied Development Co., at 30. 
Other courts have recognized on a regular basis 
that an employment at will contract may be modified by a 
public policy exception when an employee is discharged for 
reasons violative of the public policy. See, e.g., Wehr v. 
Burroughs Corp., 438 F.Supp. 1052 (E.D.Penn. 1977) 
(Pennsylvania's employment at will doctrine recognizes the 
public policy exception and allows a cause of action for 
wrongful termination of employment based on age on the 
grounds that it violates the public policy of the State of 
Pennsylvania). 
In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) plaintiff's secretary was forced to 
resign after it was discovered that she had had an affair 
with plaintiff who was married and a manager of one of 
defendant's divisions. At that time, plaintiff was allowed 
to keep his position. Shortly after her resignation was 
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obtained, she filed a sex discrimination claim against Dun & 
Bradstreet. The defendant requested Brockmeyer to file a 
written report about the events which led to his former 
secretary's resignation. Figuring he would become a 
scapegoat for the allegedly discriminative actions, 
plaintiff refused and also told defendant that, if called to 
testify, he would tell the truth. 
Three days after the defendant settled the claim 
with the former secretary, plaintiff Brockmeyer was fired. 
At that time he was offered $8,500 if he would sign a 
release agreeing not to sue Dun & Bradstreet. He refused. 
At trial, the jury was instructed that a terminated 
employee can recover damages from his or her employer "when 
the discharge violated clear and specific public policies or 
when the discharge is retaliatory or is motivated by bad 
faith or malice." Id. at 837. While the court found in 
that particular instance that defendants' behavior did not 
violate the fundamental public policy as expressed in the 
constitution or statutes, the court did recognize that "a 
wrongful discharge is actionable when the termination 
clearly contravenes the public welfare and gravely violates 
paramount requirements of public interest." ^d. at 840. 
Other states have recognized the exact same cause 
of action, for the same reasons. In Petermann v. Teamsters 
Local 396, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) the court 
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recognized that the employee is wrongfully discharged if he 
is fired because he refuses to commit perjury at the 
direction of the employer. In Frampton v. Central Indiana 
Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) the court held 
that the employee is wrongfully discharged when an employer 
fires the employee for filing a workmen's compensation 
claim. In Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) 
the court allowed a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
as one public policy exception to the employment at will 
doctrine when the employee was fired for complying with 
statutory jury duty service. 
The court wrote: 
We conclude that there can be 
circumstances in which an employer 
discharges an employee for such a socially 
undesirable motive that the employer must 
respond in damages for any injury done. 
Id. 536 P.2d at 515. 
In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. , 85 
111.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) the court allowed the 
cause of action for wrongful discharge when the employer 
fired the employee because the employee supplied information 
about another employee to the local law enforcement 
authorities. The court stated: 
No specific constitutional or 
statutory provision requires a citizen to 
take an active part in ferreting out and 
prosecution of crime, but public policy 
nevertheless favors citizen crime 
fighters. 
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Id. 421 N.E.2d at 880. 
The Oregon court also recognized that a wrongful 
discharge action may be brought when an employee is fired 
for filing a workman's compensation claim. Brown v. 
Transcon Linesy 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978). And in 
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 
1081 (1984), the Washington Court wrote: 
We join the growing majority of 
jurisdictions in recognizing the cause of 
action in tort for wrongful discharge if 
the discharge of the employee contravenes 
a clear mandate of public policy. 
Id. at 1089. See, also, Wiskotoni v. Michigan National 
Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) where wrongful 
discharge verdict in favor of plaintiff was upheld when 
plaintiff was fired for appearing, purusant to a subpoena, 
and testifying before a grand jury. 
In Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 822 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) the court found that an employee's action 
for "wrongful firing" stated a cause of action when he 
alleged that he was terminated solely to deprive him of his 
pension benefits. The court there found that there was a 
strong public policy in New York favoring the protection of 
integrity in pension plans and that to allow the action of 
the employer would be a violation of that public policy. 
See, also, Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising 
Corp., 551 F.Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Vigil v. Arzola, 102 
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N.M. 682, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. App. 1983). 
Article I §7 of the Utah Constitution expressly 
declares that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.11 Similarly, 
Article I §12 invests the accused in a criminal action of 
certain rights which cannot be violated under any 
circumstances. Likewise, it is the public policy of this 
state, and this nation, that an accused is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g. , 
State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978). 
Utah statutes similarly recognize that it is the 
policy of the state that a person be allowed to exercise his 
right to work. Utah Code Ann. §34-34-2 specifically states, 
in part: 
The exercise of the right to work 
must be protected and maintained free from 
undue restraints and coercions. 
Cf., Utah Code Ann. §34-24-1 (prohibiting blacklisting). 
In this case, the jury was instructed that there 
existed a very narrow and specific exception to the 
employment at will doctrine. Instruction No. 43 (R. 442) 
stated: 
Plaintiff was free to quit her 
employment with defendant at any time, and 
defendant was free to discharge plaintiff 
at any time without cause. However, if 
you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff was discharged 
on the basis of a false criminal 
accusation known to defendant Gibsons 
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Products Co. to be false, then you may 
find the defendant Gibsons Products Co. 
guilty of wrongful discharge of the 
plaintiff. 
This instruction requiring that the plaintiff should 
not suffer in her employment on the basis of a false 
criminal accusation which is known to the employer to be 
false is even narrower than the public policy presuming 
innocence until proven guilty. To end the person's 
employment under these circumstances imposes a penalty for 
conduct which is not criminal. 
Here, the jury found that Gibsons fired the 
plaintiff on the basis of a false accusation which it knew 
to be false. There was an abundance of evidence to support 
this finding. 
At the time of Mrs. Hodges1 arrest, Gibsons 
suspended her, but did not discharge her from her 
employment. However, once the company learned the truth 
about the chief witness and accuser of Mrs. Hodges, and once 
it learned that at its instigation, the charges would be 
dismissed, Gibsons immediately fired Mrs. Hodges. The 
jury's verdict on this issue must be sustained. 
Even if the Court finds there is no cause of action for wrongful 
termination under these outrageous facts, it must sustain the general jury verdict 
on damages if it upholds the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for malicious 
prosecution. See, Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 
1984); Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co v. Isom., 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982). 
Even though a "special verdict" form was submitted to the jury, the damage 
portion of that verdict form was clearly the equivalent of a general verdict when 
they found in favor of plaintiff on more than one cause of action. (R. 464-66). 
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Ill 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
This Court has consistently held that punitive 
damages may be awarded for conduct which is "willful, 
malicious or which manifests a reckless indifference toward 
and disregard for the rights of others." Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 277-78 (Utah 1982). See, 
also, Atkin v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, 709 
P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 
1985); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 702 P.2d 1106 
(Utah 1985). 
In this case there was an excess of sufficient 
evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the 
jury. First, there is no doubt that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish that the defendants were liable to the 
plaintiff for malicious prosecution. Their actions in 
procuring and continuing the initiation of a criminal 
proceeding against Shauna Hodges without probable cause and 
for an improper purpose clearly demonstrates malicious 
conduct fraught with reckless indifference for the rights of 
this plaintiff. See, above, Argument, Point I. 
Defendants did not make a full and fair disclosure 
to the police or the prosecuting attorney of all material 
See, e.g., Owens v. MeBride, 694 P.2d 590 (Utah 1984). There was no objection to 
the verdict form. (R. 1120-28). 
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facts they learned in their investigation of the theft which 
occurred at the West Valley store. Defendant Chad 
Crosgrovef as manager of the Gibsons West Valley store, 
testified falsely under oath and inaccurately at Mrs. 
Hodges' probable cause hearing. Furthermore, when Gibsons 
learned of the clearly and undeniably exculpatory evidence 
that the manager, the person with the best access to the 
money on the evening of September 3 and the morning of 
September 4, 1981, had admitted to being a thief and 
embezzler, it did not make any attempt whatsoever to inform 
the authorities of this fact. No conduct imaginable could 
be more outrageous, malicious, willful or done with greater 
reckless indifference to the rights of this plaintiff. 
IV 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SPECIAL 
AND GENERAL DAMAGES WAS CORRECT 
Defendants complain that Jury Instruction No. 11 (R. 
410) and No. 46 (R. 445) did not conform with the 
pleadings. Defendants attempt to limit plaintiff to $75,000 
claiming she asked for only that much. This ignores the 
actual pleadings. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that: 
Plaintiff has been injured and 
suffered damages including, but not 
limited to, loss of wages, medical 
expenses, severe emotional distress and 
mental anguish requiring professional 
therapy and further pain and suffering at 
least in the amount of $75,000, the full 
of extent of which has not been 
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determinedf and which will be established 
by proof at time of trial, 
(R. 6) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in her prayer for relief, plaintiff 
prayed for judgment as follows: 
1. In the sum of $75,000 and such 
other sums that plaintiff shall establish 
by proof at the time of trial. 
In Cox v. Johnston, 484 P.2d 116 (Col. App. 1971) 
the Colorado Court of Appeals was faced with a very similar 
issue. In that case, the plaintiff alleged the nature of 
his special damages, but not the amount. The defendants 
contended, as the defendants do here, that since there was 
no amount pled, plaintiff failed to allege special damages 
as required by Rule 9(g) of the Colorado Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court held that although special damages 
must be specifically pled in order to recover, "there is no 
requirement that the dollar amount be specifically 
pleaded." Id. at 120. Cf. Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975); Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306 
(Utah 1975) . 
There is no doubt that plaintiff gave the 
defendants actual notice of the special damages she would 
claim at trial. Likewise, there is no doubt that the 
defendants were apprised of the fact that plaintiff intended 
to prove compensatory damages, both general and special in 
an amount in excess of $75,000. Defendants1 argument that 
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they were deprived of adequate notice is totally without 
merit. 
Additionallyf there is substantial evidence to 
prove the amount of damages awarded. It is important to 
note that the special verdict form (R. 464-66) referred only 
to compensatory damages and did not distinguish between 
general or special damages. Plaintiff testified extensively 
to the severe mental distress she endured as a result of the 
wrongful actions of the defendants. (R. 936-39). 
Similarlyf plaintiff's husband testified extensively as to 
the effect and mental distress his wife displayed. (R. 
1000-05). Such mental pain and suffering is entitled to 
compensation. Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325f 1329 (Utah 
1975). 
Likewise, there is substantial evidence showing the 
amount of attorneys fees plaintiff incurred in defending the 
criminal action. (R. 931-35; Exs. 24 & 25). There was also 
extensive evidence detailing the plaintiff's therapy bills 
which were incurred as a proximate cause of the wrongful 
acts of the defendants. (R. 935-49; Exs. 18 & 26). 
Finally, there also was extensive evidence demonstrating the 
lost wages suffered by plaintiff. (R.-949-57; Exs. 28 & 
29). These three items of damages totalled $26,515. (Exs. 
18, 24, 25, 26 & 29). In short, defendants1 argument that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's damage 
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verdict is frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the verdict of 
the jury be sustained. This verdict was supported by ample 
evidence and the jury's thoughtful deliberations should not 
be disturbed. 
DATED: June / / . 1986. 
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